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Abstract. Criminal organizations exploit their presence on territories
and local communities to recruit new workforce in order to carry out
their criminal activities and business. The ability to attract individuals
is crucial for maintaining power and control over the territories in which
these groups are settled. This study proposes the formalization, devel-
opment and analysis of an agent-based model (ABM) that simulates a
neighborhood of Palermo (Sicily) with the aim to understand the path-
ways that lead individuals to recruitment into organized crime groups
(OCGs). Using empirical data on social, economic and criminal condi-
tions of the area under analysis, we use a multi-layer network approach
to simulate this scenario. As the final goal, we test different policies to
counter recruitment into OCGs. These scenarios are based on two differ-
ent dimensions of prevention and intervention: (i) primary and secondary
socialization and (ii) law enforcement targeting strategies.
Keywords: Criminal Organizations · Disruption Strategies · Public Pol-
icy · Criminal Involvement · Law Enforcement
Introduction
Organized crime (OC hereinafter) is present in a wide number of countries all
over the world [12, 25, 4, 1, 27]. Besides the peculiar differences between different
criminal organisations, they all pose social, economic and security challenges to
societies, institutions and legal economies. OCGs are capable to attract people
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and strengthen their presence on a territory. Human workforce is a crucial asset
for OCGs: a higher number of affiliates and members is an indicator of the ac-
tual resources at their disposal and a measure of the potential strength of the
groups itself. Understanding how recruitment works, then, becomes a relevant
issue both from the research and the policy standpoints. Scientific inquiry can
help in pursuing this goal. However, investigating recruitment dynamics at scale
is extremely costly in a real-world setting, involving first and foremost feasibility
constraints. Additionally, it also poses ethical questions that are often present
when dealing with social experiments. Computer simulations, conversely, can
overcome these issues. With this regard, their potential has also started to be
investigated in criminology [6, 16, 24, 19].
In light of these considerations, this paper presents the rationale and structure
of an agent-based model of recruitment into OC. To best of our knowledge, this
is the first simulation model that specifically integrates computational science
and criminology to address the problem of recruitment into OC. The ABM will
resemble a neighbourhood of Palermo, the main city of Sicily: our artificial soci-
ety will comprise 10,000 agents with socio-economic, demographic and criminal
characteristics derived from empirical data. The society will be modelled through
a multiplex network structure. The investigation of recruitment dynamics will
be coupled with the final goal of the simulation, which is the testing of potential
policies to prevent or reduce recruitment into OCGs, especially for youth.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the theoretical framework part will
briefly cover the main theories that constitute the criminological backbone of
the model. The Data section will describe the empirical information used in the
ABM and the sources from which data have been extracted. The Main Structure
section will thoroughly explain the rationale of the multiplex approach and the
two main components of the model. Finally, in the Policy Scenarios section, the
two proposed families of counter-policies that respectively deal with socialisation
and network disruption will be presented.
1 Theoretical Framework
The rationale of our simulated society is rooted in the outcomes of a recent sys-
tematic review on the factors leading to recruitment into OC [20]. Furthermore,
it also takes into account several theoretical perspectives. Some of these suggest
that organised crime is embedded in the social environment and that social re-
lations are crucial for the recruitment into organised crime. With this regard,
differential association theory and social learning theory [23, 8, 7] posit that
crime in its various aspects is learned in a social environment by relating with
other criminal agents. Empirical studies have also highlighted that OC is socially
and criminally embedded in the surrounding environment [14, 18]. The position
agents occupy within a criminal network determines their possibilities to commit
crimes. In this sense, an agent’s valuable criminal ties determine his social op-
portunity structure [15]. Conversely, other theories such as the general theory of
crime [13] argue that an individual’s low self-control levels determine an inability
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to compute the negative consequences of one’s criminal behaviour, thereby deter-
mining persisting patterns of criminality throughout his life. The general theory
of crime contends that group crime does not have specific characteristics and that
the formation of criminal groups is mostly driven by self-selection processes. The
social relations (i.e., social learning and differential association) and self-control
(i.e., general theory of crime) perspectives may generate opposing views about
the recruitment into organised crime: however, a more comprehensive explana-
tion of criminal activity could be reached via the combination of elements of
both frameworks. With this regard, the development of an agent-based model
is a convenient way to do so, since its flexibility can allow to integrate both
personal and inter-personal components. In light of this, the present model op-
erationalizes criminal involvement both as the result of interaction with others
and as emerging from agents individual characteristics pushing towards crime.
2 The Model
2.1 Data
Using empirical data to feed the simulations is fundamental when aiming at
setting up a reasonable and grounded model, besides theoretical and formal
mechanisms (e.g., the mechanism of crime commission). Furthermore, data shall
also be used ex-post to assess whether the model produces reliable and plausible
results, especially considering the policy-oriented objectives of the ABM. To
develop the model and validate the results, we have retrieved and processed
several data from different sources regarding specific demographic, economic,
social and criminal aspects. We have chosen the city of Palermo as the specific
setting to be resembled by the simulation model, as Palermo is one of the cities
with the highest mafia presence in Italy [11] (Table 1).
2.2 A Multiplex-Network Approach
Simulating the dynamics and processes that lead to the recruitment into OC
requires to take into account a wide variety of factors. While certain elements
are inherently linked to the individual sphere (e.g. age, gender), others span
over the personal characteristics of an agent: making new friends, for instance,
is dependent upon the social environment in which an agent is set. Two children
at the elementary school are more likely to become friends if they are in the
same classroom or if they have the same age, rather than being separate into
different classrooms or belong to different years.
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Table 1: Data Employed to Inform and Validate the Simulation
Data
Variable
Type
Source,
Time Span
Distribution of female fertility
according to age
Demographic Istat, 2017
Mortality probability
by age and gender
Demographic Istat, 2016
Wealth level distribution by
a person’s level of education
Economic
Bank of Italy Survey, 2016
Istat, 2011
Distribution of employer sizes
in Palermo
Economic Istat, 2011
Household size distribution
by the household head’s age
in Palermo
Demographic
Census data, Istat 2011,
Municipality of Palermo
Distribution of household
sizes in Palermo
Demographic
Census data, Istat 2011,
Municipality of Palermo
Distributionof household type
by age of household head
Demographic
Census data, Istat 2011,
Municipality of Palermo
Distribution of people’s age
by gender in Palermo
Demographic Istat, 2018
Number of schools in the city
of Palermo by level of
education
Social
Ministry of Education
and Research, 2016
Distribution of Mafia families
in Palermo
Criminal
Corte d’Appello di
Reggio Calabria, 2012;
Criminal Investigations
“Aemilia”, “Crimine”,
“Infinito”, “Minotauro”
Co-offending prevalence Criminal Istat, 2012-2016
Crime rates
(corrected for dark number)
Criminal Istat, 2012-2016
Punishment distribution Criminal Istat, 2012-2016
Imprisonment length distribution Criminal Istat, 2012-2016
In real life, every person engages in different types of relations, e.g. as part of
a family, in friendships, at work, and - if criminals - in co-offending. A member
of an OCG is also part of a wider social environment as embedded in multiple
social worlds. The literature proves that relations of different types may drive
the involvement and recruitment into organised crime [2, 3, 5]. To adequately
address the dynamics of individual and social drivers, we opted for an ABM
based on a multiplex rationale. A multiplex network includes several networks,
each mapping specific social relations. Five relational layers are modelled in the
simulations: families, friendship networks, professional and school ties, criminal
relations and organised crime groups (Figure 1).
Considering the need for creating a society that synthetically mirrors the
real-world, we have decided to include all the main dimensions through which
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Fig. 1: Graphic Depiction of the Multiplex Network Structure
an individual can realistically act and behave. The structure, topology and char-
acteristics of the networks are empirically grounded using official statistics or
replicating mechanics found in existing scientific works. The multiplex network
framework also allows for considering individual-level characteristics as agents
attributes, thus making possible to analyse individual and social factors to simu-
late realistic recruitment dynamics. Agents in the simulation, regardless of being
or not part of an OC groups, can be born, get engaged/married, make children,
die, create and break relations, and commit crimes.
Specifically focusing on the organised crime dimension, the model considers one
single OCG existing in the simulation. Its internal structure, composition (in
terms of gender distribution and generation/age distribution) reflects the ones
found through analyses of several police investigations on Italian OC groups.
2.3 Recruitment into Organised Crime
For the purpose of this simulation, recruitment occurs when an agent commits
a crime with at least another agent who is already a member of the OCG.5 This
option was driven by different considerations. First, it is observable and eas-
ily operationalizable. Requiring the commission of a crime with OCG members
models in a straightforward way the process of recruitment, avoiding subjective
evaluations. Second, it is broadly consistent with the criminal law approaches
criminalising organised crime across countries [9]. Two different complementary
dimensions contribute to the determination of the recruitment processes in the
model, namely the probability of committing a crime (called C) and the embed-
dedness into organised crime (called R) (Figure 2).
5 It has to be noted that the model is initialised with a certain number of agents
estimated based on data retrieved from criminal investigation, as showed in Table 1.
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Fig. 2: Synthetic Description of the General Structure of the Model
Modelling Crime Commission: the “C” Function The C function models
the probability that agent i will commit a crime at time t. Its structure revolves
around two components: the probability of committing a crime given gender and
age class and the risk of committing a crime associated with several social and
criminal factors. The first component has been derived estimating baseline prob-
abilities of committing a crime in Sicily using official statistics. The probabilities
are computed using both the figures on reported crimes and data gathered from
victimisation surveys. This complementary computation allows to eliminate the
problem of dark figure. The dark figure refers to the difference between the real
number of crimes and the actual reported number of crimes [21]. In the model,
we have thus reliably estimated the actual real number of crimes occurred in
Palermo in the period 2012-2016. Baseline probabilities are reported in Table 2.
The second component originates from empirical findings in the existing lit-
erature. Specifically, several systematic reviews providing information on the im-
pact of certain factors on the general probability of committing a crime. These
sources provide effect sizes (in different forms, e.g. odds ratios) allowing to deter-
mine the different probabilities of coming a crime given an agents network and
individual characteristics. The list of individual factor-based rules that drive the
model rules for committing a crime is presented in Table 3.
Given the data at our disposal, we model the probability of committing a
crime p(C¯) for an individual i at time t as:
p(C¯)i,t =
(C|θ(g, a)i,t)
 m∑
j=1
γji,t
+ ε (1)
where (C|θ(g, a)i,t) is the baseline probability for the individual given its gender
and age class, and (
∑m
j=1 γji,t) is the summation of the risk factors γ and ε is an
error term stochastically distributed in order to bound the individual probabili-
ties of committing a crime to the population average. Specifically, given the odds
ratio of a risk factor, we increase/decrease the baseline risk by the percentage
provided by the Odds Ratio (OR) itself (e.g.: if the OR is equal to 1.41, and an
individual has it among their characteristics, and their baseline is 0.15, it means
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Table 2: Gender and age class probabilities ((C|θ(g, a)) and Odds Ratios of
committing a crime in Palermo
(Sex, Age Class) Probability OR
(Female, ≤13 yrs) 0.0004 0.0004
(Female, 14-17) 0.0223 0.0229
(Female, 18-24) 0.0511 0.0538
(Female, 25-34) 0.0634 0.0677
(Female, 35-44) 0.0643 0.0687
(Female, 45-54) 0.0489 0.0514
(Female, 55-64) 0.0308 0.0318
(Female, ≥ 65) 0.0111 0.0112
(Male, ≤13 yrs) 0.0022 0.0022
(Male, 14-17) 0.1502 0.1767
(Male, 18-24) 0.3019 0.4324
(Male, 25-34) 0.3036 0.4359
(Male, 35-44) 0.2751 0.3795
(Male, 45-54) 0.1996 0.2494
(Male, 55-64) 0.1268 0.1453
(Male, ≥ 65) 0.0537 0.0567
Table 3: Individual-level Factors (γ) Driving the Crime Commission Process -
Odds Ratios
Risk Factor OR Definition
Unemployment 1.30 Having/not having a job
Education 0.94 Having/not having an high school
diploma
Natural Propensity 1.97 Having a crime propensity higher
than a certain value x (log-normally
distributed in the population)
Criminal History 1.62 Having/not having committed a
crime in the past
Criminal Family 1.45 Having a share of criminal family
ties which is higher or equal to 0.5.*
Criminal Friends
and Co-Workers
1.81 Having a share of criminal friends
ties which is higher or equal to 0.5.**
OC Membership 4.5 Being part of an OC group
*
A criminal family tie is a direct link with a family member which has committed
at least one crime in the last 2 years.
** A criminal friendship/professional tie is a direct link with a family member which
has committed at least one crime in the last 2 years.
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that the final value has to be the product between the baseline and 0.41, namely
the increase of the risk in percentage given that risk factor). Therefore, at each
time of reference t¯ and for each subset of the population (g, a) of given gender
and age class, the following equation shall hold:
C(g, a)t¯ ≈ 1n(g, a)
n(g,a)∑
i=1
p(C¯) (2)
The equation means that at each time of reference, the average probability of
committing a crime for all individuals belonging to the same (gender,age) class
shall be approximately similar to the fixed average values presented in Table
1, where approximately means that we can allow the model to float in a ±
0.1 range in order not to set overly deterministic mechanics to the model. In
other words, we model the distribution of C as a strictly stationary and ergodic
random process:
FC [C(g, a)t1 , ... , C(g, a)tk ] = FC
[
C(g, a)t1+τ , ... , C(g, a)tk+τ
]
for ∀ τ, t1, ..., tk
(3)
C has been computed to provide realistic figures on committed offences within
the model, in the form of rates by 100,000 inhabitants, using official statistics for
different years (2012-2016, specifically). The calculation relied on the correction
of crime figures by the dark number of each crime category. This allowed to
take into account and include also those offences that have not been discovered
or prosecuted in the original data at our disposal, thus giving more solid and
reliable estimates.
Most crimes are committed by single offenders [22, 17, 10]. Based on the liter-
ature on co-offending, a few crimes will require more than one offender. These
works also help in shaping the mechanisms that lead two or more individuals
to commit a crime together. Peer and more in general social influence play a
relevant role in driving this criminal cooperation [26]. The model thus matches
co-offenders based on mechanisms of social proximity: the closer two agents are
in terms of social relations across network layers and the higher is the value of
C of both individuals, the higher the probability of becoming co-offenders.
Once agents commit crimes they can be incarcerated. Incarceration is estimated
using empirical data retrieved from official statistics. Apart from family links,
an agent in prison loses all the ties that he/she has created during his/her life
(including during his/her job). The mechanism for incarceration is based on a
countdown that allows to establish when the agent leaves prison and returns to
be free in the society, recovering part of its ties.
Modelling Organized Crime Embeddedness: Defining “R”. R defines
the embeddedness into OC and allows to adequately model the probability of
an artificial agent to be recruited into a criminal organisation. R seeks to con-
sider the role of each agents social community in the process of recruitment. The
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theoretically-driven assumption is that individuals that are embedded in com-
munities (across all types of networks considered by our simulation) that are
highly populated by OC members face higher risks of being recruited. R affects
the selection of new OC members in the simulation. For example, among two
equally suitable co-offenders, OC members are likely to co-offend with the agent
who is more embedded in OC. In a simple form - but coherently with the differ-
ential association and social learning theories as well as the social embeddedness
of OC - R is then operationalised as the proportion of OC members among the
social relations of each individual (comprising family, friendship, school, working
and co-offending relations).
In mathematical notation, a multiplex network G = {G1, ..., Gl, ..., GM} which
resembles our simulated society is a set of M single-layer networks that get dy-
namically updated at each time unit t. Each single-layer network is denoted
as Gl = (V,E), that takes the form of a N × N matrix. Given this nota-
tion, for each Gl, we define an h-hop neighbourhood graph for each node i.
The node set of the h-hop neighbourhood graph is defined as the set Nhi ={
j|k ∈ Nh−1i , j ∈ V, (k, j) ∈ E
} ∪ Nh−1i with h ≥ 1. The set of edges is then
formalised as Ehi =
{
(j, k)|j ∈ Nh−1i , k ∈ Nhi , (j, k) ∈ E)
}
. The local neighbour-
hood of agent i in the single layer network Gl = (V,E) becomes then a vector
wG
l
i =
[
wG
l
i,l · · ·wG
l
i,j
]
where each element represents the weight of the edges in-
cluded in the h-hop local neighbourhood of the agent. Each value of the vector
follows the relation w ∝ h−1, meaning that the weights are inversely propor-
tional to the distance between the ego i and an agent j included in the h-hop
network. At this point, to compute the embeddedness R of an agent i in his local
community, we sum over the vectors of each single-layer network:
wG =
[
wG
1
i,l · · ·wG
1
i,j
]
+ · · ·+
[
wG
l
i,l · · ·wG
l
i,j
]
=
[
wGi,l · · ·wGi,j
]
(4)
This equation yields the resultant vector of weights deriving from the complete
agent’s h-hop network. To calculate the actual OC embeddedness, we derive
the resultant vector of weights obtained from the agent’s h-hop OC network
ΘGi =
[
θGi,l · · · θGi,j
]
, such that the node set is called Nhi OC and the set of edges is
Ehi OC , where N
h
i OC ⊆ Nhi and Ehi OC ⊆ Ehi . R is finally mathematically defined
as:
Ri =
∑NhOC
i=1 θ
G
i,j∑Nh
i=1 w
G
i,j
∈ [0, 1] (5)
which is the ratio between the total number of weights in the OC h-hop network
and the general h-hop network of agent i. The values of R fall in the range [0,1],
with 1 indicating complete overlapping between the general h-hop networks and 0
highlighting total absence of OC members in the local community of the agent.
The proposed method implicitly weights the OC embeddedness such that (i.)
the importance of OC ties is inversely proportional to the distance and (ii.) the
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importance of OC ties (but also of other non-OC ties) is proportional to the
number of different ties between any two individuals.
In addition to the contribution in determining recruitment, R provides useful
information also to analyse the general dynamics of the model. First, it enables
to clearly distinguish between active OC members and pro-OC agents. An agent
may be strongly embedded in OC-prone networks but not necessarily be a mem-
ber. For example, this could be the case of women who are certainly living in
OC-prone contexts (e.g. wives and daughters of OC members) but are rarely
charged and convicted as OC members since they generally refrain from com-
mitting offences. Similarly, a juvenile son of an OC member who is just two
years old cannot be considered an active member, but would still have a very
high value of R, making it very likely that he will be recruited in the future. Sec-
ond, R may contribute to the simulation of prevention policies, especially those
on the primary and secondary socialisation. The simulation will need to identify
the target population and R could contribute in identifying the population at
risk better than merely relying on other indicators e.g. the number of crimes
committed by the parents or the involvement of a parent into OC.
3 Policy Scenarios
The policy scenarios that have been selected constitute the final goal of the ABM
and they have followed suggestions and remarks given by policymakers belonging
to several European institutions (e.g., Europol, Dutch Ministry of Justice, Italian
Ministry of Interior). They are specifically divided into two distinct types: (i)
primary and secondary socialisation and (ii) law enforcement.
3.1 Primary and Secondary Socialisation
This policy scenario aims at protecting juveniles from socialisation processes
leading them to recruitment into OC. Among the possible solutions, policies
aiming at decreasing or countering the influence of OC-prone social relations
may offer an effective strategy to prevent the recruitment into OC. These poli-
cies will be modelled through different solutions. They include (a) reducing the
influence of parents (normally the father), (b) addition of pro-social ties such
as non-criminal friends, (c) provision of educational and job opportunities (in-
creasing education achievement, wealth and work ties). This scenario will put to
the test and compare the effectiveness of these strategies both as separate and
combined treatments.
The primary socialisation policy targets young people aged 12-18 living in OC
families, intended as OC families, families where at least one parent is an OC
member. It will be possible to select the share of the target young people based
on a risk score reflecting the family embeddedness (R) in OC and/or based on
the OC members convicted in the simulation. This group of juveniles at risk will
then be subjected to interventions measures aimed at reducing OC parental ties.
For instance, the simulation will be able to model cases in which court orders
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limit the contacts between people involved in OC and their families or cases of
OC members’ conviction and imprisonment. In such cases, the ABM will tem-
porarily decrease the relation that OC members have with their families and
children while also providing juveniles at risk and their mothers with social and
welfare support (e.g. school support, employment support).
The secondary socialisation policy aims at children and young people aged 6-18
who are in school. Crime-prone children, i.e. those with higher criminal propen-
sity C, will be targeted with increased social support and/or increased welfare
support. Increased social support may include: (a) better educational support (in
the ABM, the agent will complete high school and/or achieve a higher level of ed-
ucation), (b) support of psychologists and social workers (promotion of pro-social
relations and inhibition of anti-social relations, randomly creating friendship ties
with non-deviant peers and adults), (c) increased social activities between chil-
dren (children will randomly create new friendship ties), and/or (d) move child
to new school classes. Increased welfare support instead may include providing
a job to the child’s mother (resulting in diversification of mother’s networks)
and/or providing the child with a job when they turn 16 (resulting in diversifi-
cation of the child’s social networks and lower risk of crime commission).
3.2 Law Enforcement Targeting Policies
This scenario aims at analysing the impact on the recruitment into OC of dif-
ferent law enforcement strategies in tackling OCGs. In particular, the possible
targets will consist of (a) OC group bosses/lieutenants (in the model, potentially
OC agents with high scores in measures such as betweenness) and (b) workers in
facilitator positions. Facilitators include logistic workers, such as long-distance
truck drivers and airport workers, and legal and financial advisors. These agents
have increased opportunities for crime due to their work position (e.g. drug
smuggling, money laundering). This scenario will put to the test and compare
the effectiveness of LEAs targeting OC bosses/leaders and facilitators toward
reducing crime rates and OC recruitment, both as separate and combined poli-
cies.
Regarding highly central OC members, two policies are proposed: (a.1) Higher
scrutiny of OC members (it will decrease their ability to commit crimes and
consequently create OC ties) and (a.2) Higher repression of OC members (it
will lead to higher imprisonment rates for OC members). For what concerns
facilitator workers, policies are related to: (b.1) Higher scrutiny of facilitator
positions (will decrease facilitators probability of crime commission and OC tie
creation) and (b.2) Higher repression of criminal facilitators (will lead to higher
imprisonment rates for criminal facilitators).
4 Conclusions
This paper has presented the rationale, input data and structure of an ABM
designed to model recruitment into OC and to test different types of policies to
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contrast the strength of criminal groups in attracting new individuals. The model
relies on empirical data gathered from official statistics when possible, and on
information gathered from scientific literature otherwise. It is highly dependent
on two dimensions, namely C and R. C formalises the individual probability of
committing a crime of each agent, given its social, economic and criminal char-
acteristics. R, conversely, quantifies the extent to which an agent is embedded
into an highly OC-prone local community. This two-fold structure is a flexible
and convenient solution that also permits to model and monitor non-criminal
social processes, avoiding an overly narrow landscape of the simulation. This
ABM originates in the context of PROTON, a three-year Horizon 2020-funded
project and will ultimately lead to the development of a user-friendly interactive
tool at the disposal of policy-makers, practitioners and analysts interested in
running virtual experiments to assess the potential consequences of a given poli-
cies. While this paper only presents the Palermo scenario, another model based
on the same principles and structure will mirror the scenario of the Dutch city
of Eindhoven, to assess external validity of results outside of the Italian context
which is extremely peculiar due to the longstanding Mafia tradition. Further-
more, users will be able to test alternative societies via the possibility to modify
sensitive hyper-parameters such as unemployment rate, criminal presence and
law enforcement repression in order to resemble other European contexts.
Bibliography
[1] Abadinsky, H.: History of Organized Crime in the United States.
In: Bruinsma, G., Weisburd, D. (eds.) Encyclopedia of Criminol-
ogy and Criminal Justice, pp. 2204–2206. Springer New York (2014).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2˙624, http://link.springer.
com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_624
[2] Arlacchi, P.: La mafia imprenditrice. Il Mulino, Bologna (1983)
[3] Arsovska, J.: Decoding Albanian organized crime: Culture, politics, and
globalization. University of California Press, Oakland (2015)
[4] Athanassaopolou, E.: Organized Crime in Southeast Europe. Routledge
(Oct 2013)
[5] Brancaccio, L.: I clan di camorra: genesi e storia. Donzelli Editore (2017)
[6] Brantingham, P.L., Glasser, U., Kinney, B., Singh, K., Vajihollahi, M.:
A computational model for simulating spatial aspects of crime in ur-
ban environments. In: 2005 IEEE International Conference on Sys-
tems, Man and Cybernetics. vol. 4, pp. 3667–3674 Vol. 4 (Oct 2005).
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSMC.2005.1571717
[7] Bruinsma, G.: Differential Association Theory (2014)
[8] Burgess, R.L., Akers, R.L.: A Differential Association-Reinforcement
Theory of Criminal Behavior. Social Problems 14(2), 128–147 (Oct 1966).
https://doi.org/10.2307/798612, https://academic.oup.com/socpro/
article-lookup/doi/10.2307/798612
[9] Calderoni, F.: Organized Crime Legislation in the European Union.
Springer International Publishing (2010), http://www.springer.com/us/
book/9783642043307
[10] Carrington, P.J., van Mastrigt, S.B.: Co-offending in Canada, England and
the United States: a cross-national comparison. Global Crime 14(2-3), 123–
140 (May 2013). https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2013.787926, http://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17440572.2013.787926
[11] Dugato, M., Calderoni, F., Campedelli, G.M.: Measuring Organised
Crime Presence at the Municipal Level. Social Indicators Research
(Aug 2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-019-02151-7, http://link.
springer.com/10.1007/s11205-019-02151-7
[12] Fijnaut, C., Paoli, L.: Organised Crime in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and
Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond. Springer Science &
Business Media, New York (Dec 2004)
[13] Gottfredson, M.R., Hirschi, T.: A general theory of crime. Stanford Univer-
sity Press (1990)
[14] Granovetter, M.: Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem
of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91(3), 481–510 (1985),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780199
[15] Kleemans, E.R., de Poot, C.J.: Criminal Careers in Organized Crime
and Social Opportunity Structure. European Journal of Criminology
14 G.M. Campedelli et al.
5(1), 69–98 (Jan 2008). https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370807084225, http:
//journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1477370807084225
[16] Malleson, N., Heppenstall, A., See, L.: Crime reduction through
simulation: An agent-based model of burglary. Computers, En-
vironment and Urban Systems 34(3), 236–250 (May 2010).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compenvurbsys.2009.10.005, http://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0198971509000787
[17] van Mastrigt, S.B., Farrington, D.P.: Co-Offending, Age, Gender and Crime
Type: Implications for Criminal Justice Policy. British Journal of Criminol-
ogy 49(4), 552–573 (Jul 2009). https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azp021, https:
//academic.oup.com/bjc/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/bjc/azp021
[18] McCarthy, B., Hagan, J.: Getting into Street Crime: The Structure and Pro-
cess of Criminal Embeddedness. Social Science Research 24(1), 63–95 (Mar
1995). https://doi.org/10.1006/ssre.1995.1003, https://ac.els-cdn.
com/S0049089X85710034/1-s2.0-S0049089X85710034-main.pdf?
_tid=25ea6aef-12fe-4d42-85a3-7e18ba82cd66&acdnat=1523278952_
1c093a562932d2b2696093a8b3958106
[19] Nardin, L.G., Andrighetto, G., Conte, R., Szkely, A., Anzola, D.,
Elsenbroich, C., Lotzmann, U., Neumann, M., Punzo, V., Troitzsch,
K.G.: Simulating protection rackets: a case study of the Sicilian
Mafia. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 30(6), 1117–1147
(Nov 2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-016-9330-z, https://link.
springer.com/article/10.1007/s10458-016-9330-z
[20] Savona, E., Calderoni, F., Superchi, E., Comunale, T., Campedelli, G.M.,
Marchesi, M., Kamprad, A.: Systematic review of the social, psychological
and economic factors relating to criminalisation and recruitment to OC.
Tech. rep. (Dec 2017), https://www.projectproton.eu/media-room/
[21] Skogan, W.G.: Dimensions of the Dark Figure of Unre-
ported Crime. Crime & Delinquency 23(1), 41–50 (1977).
https://doi.org/10.1177/001112877702300104, https://doi.org/10.
1177/001112877702300104
[22] Stolzenberg, L., D’Alessio, S.J.: Co-Offending and the Age-Crime Curve.
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 45(1), 65–86 (Feb 2008).
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022427807309441, http://journals.sagepub.
com/doi/10.1177/0022427807309441
[23] Sutherland, E.H.: The Professional Thief. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago (1937)
[24] Troitzsch, K.G.: Extortion Rackets: An Event-Oriented Model of Interven-
tions. In: Elsenbroich, C., Anzola, D., Gilbert, N. (eds.) Social dimensions of
organised crime: modelling the dynamics of extortion rackets, pp. 117–131.
Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, New York, NY, 1st edition edn.
(2016)
[25] Varese, F.: Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Conquers New Ter-
ritories. Princeton University Press (Jan 2011)
[26] Weerman, F.M.: Theories of Co-offending. In: Bruinsma, G., Weisburd, D.
(eds.) Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice, pp. 5173–5184.
A Policy-oriented Agent-based Model of Recruitment into Organized Crime 15
Springer New York, New York, NY (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-
4614-5690-2˙110, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_110
[27] Williams, P.: Nigerian Criminal Organizations. In: The Oxford Hanbook of
Organized Crime, pp. 254–269. Oxford University Press, New York (2014)
